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Abstract
This paper identifies the impact of borrowing constraints on homeownership in the U.S. in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis. While homeownership declines and tightened credit are evident, the role the
tightening of credit has had on the probability of individual households to become homeowners has not been
previously identified. The homeownership rate in 2010-2013 is estimated to be 2.3 percentage points lower
than if the constraints were set at the 2001 level.
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Borrowing constraints enable lenders to man-
age risk using  non-price terms in the presence of 
imperfect information but also impact the ability 
of households to become homeowners. Some 
individual households’ welfare would improve 
if constraints were lifted. However, as the sub-
prime crisis demonstrates, indiscriminately lift-
ing borrowing constraints increases risk in the 
mortgage market unsustainably and can entail 
systemic risk.
The literature has identified three constraints 
that limit access to mortgages: wealth (through 
maximum loan to value ratio); income (through 
maximum debt to income ratio); and credit (through minimum credit score). Households 
with insufficient wealth or income (relative to 
their preferred housing consumption and local 
house prices) or an inadequate credit score are 
unable to become owners even if that would be 
the optimal tenure based on their preferences, 
expected duration of residence, and user cost of 
owning relative to renting.
Changes in the mortgage market can lead to 
relaxed borrowing constraints, expanded access 
to mortgages, and increased homeownership. 
Whether such credit expansions are sustained 
depends on the ability of financial markets and 
regulations to ensure proper risk management 
and assessment.
The first section reviews evidence of the exis-
tence of credit rationing in the US mortgage 
market. The second section discusses the impact 
of borrowing constraints on homeownership 
outcomes post World War II. The third section 
presents new estimates of the effect of borrow-
ing constraints in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis.
I. Credit Rationing and Homeownership
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) develop a model 
in which lenders ration access to credit using 
 non-price terms. Lenders’ ability to  risk-base 
price is limited by the high transaction and 
information costs associated with estimating 
credit risk, the presence of unobservable char-
acteristics that affect credit risk, and the effect 
of higher interest rates on adverse selection and 
moral hazard. The empirical literature provides 
evidence of credit rationing in the mortgage 
market (Duca and Rosenthal 1994). Lenders use 
 non-rate terms to limit adverse selection associ-
ated with higher interest rates or moral hazard 
for borrowers with little collateral. In this con-
text, borrowers who cannot meet a minimum 
down payment requirement, for example, will 
not be able to obtain a mortgage even if they are 
willing to pay a higher interest rate.
Due to the reliance on access to credit to 
purchase a home, the mortgage borrowing con-
straints that arise from credit rationing affect 
households’ tenure (and the quantity of hous-
ing services they consume). Linneman and 
Wachter (1989) show that wealth and income 
constrained households have a lower propensity 
to be homeowners.1
1 Duca and Rosenthal (1994) and Rosenthal (2002) find 
similar results, as does Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter 
(1996) with wealth endogenized. 
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The literature shows that young and minority 
households are particularly impacted by bor-
rowing constraints. Haurin, Hendershott, and 
Wachter (1996) find that young households are 
more likely to be constrained and that being 
constrained has a large effect on the propensity 
of a young household to own. Barakova et al. (2003) look at recent movers under age 50 in 
1989, 1995, and 1998 among households com-
prising the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances and estimate that home-
ownership would double from about 30 percent 
to about 60 percent in that population if con-
straint removal were feasible. Examining dif-
ferences across white and minority households, 
Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter (1999) find 
that minority households are both more likely 
to be wealth constrained and less likely to be 
homeowners when constrained. Their results do 
not indicate significant differences across races 
in the homeownership rate of unconstrained 
households.
These studies were conducted in periods with 
moderate house price appreciation, which would 
tend to limit the binding impact of borrowing 
constraints. Rapidly rising house prices contrib-
ute to increasing the demand for homeownership 
due to backward looking higher expectations for 
price appreciation (Case and Shiller 1989). With 
rising house prices, constraints become more 
binding increasing pressure to relax them; and 
the level of constraints themselves may become 
endogenous and  procyclical, contributing to 
financial instability.
II. Borrowing Constraints and Homeownership 
Post-World War II
In the post-World War II period we have seen 
three different mortgage lending regimes charac-
terized by differing borrowing constraint condi-
tions and homeownership outcomes. Borrowing 
constraints can change as the result of regulatory 
shifts or financial innovations or market pres-
sures. The mechanism through which the loos-
ening of constraints occurs has implications for 
the sustainability of the expansion of credit and 
homeownership access.
From 1940 to 1960, the US homeownership 
rate increased by almost 20 percentage points, 
from 44 percent to 62 percent (US Census 
Bureau 2015). New government entities in the 
mortgage market, established in the aftermath of 
the Great Depression, specifically FHA and the 
secondary market institution Fannie Mae, along 
with the economic expansion that followed 
World War II, contributed to this rise. According 
to Fetter (2013), the  self-amortizing  long-term 
fixed rate mortgage with lower down payments, 
introduced by FHA, was a major factor in this 
rapid and large increase.
For the subsequent three decades of this post-
World War II regime, between the 1960s and 
the 1990s, homeownership remained stable. 
The conventional  self-amortizing 30-year fixed 
rate “American” mortgage (Green and Wachter 
2005) provided housing finance, funded by 
banks and S&Ls, through deposits, until the 
1980s.2 In the aftermath of the S&L crisis, in 
the 1980s and the 1990s, this instrument con-
tinued to prevail, funded by the secondary mar-
ket.3 Despite substantial population growth and 
increasing inflation over this period, housing 
remained affordable due to this instrument, ris-
ing incomes, and an elastic housing supply.
Starting in the late 1990s, but accelerating 
during the years 2003 to 2007, a combination 
of regulatory shifts, changes to the structure of 
the mortgage market, and rising house prices, 
generated the second mortgage lending regime, 
which would prove to be turbulent (McCoy, 
Pavlov, and Wachter 2009). The expansion of 
credit in the latter part of this period was quite 
dramatic.4 The number of purchase mortgages 
originated increased from 4.3 in 2001 to 5.7 
million in 2004 and remained above 5.5 million 
through 2006 (FFIEC 2015).
This increase in debt was not the result of 
changes in underlying debt repayment capacity 
of households (such as a positive shock to per-
manent income) but of changes in credit supply (Levitin and Wachter 2012). During the same 
2 In this period mortgages were effectively rationed. 
Competition for deposits was limited due to Regulation Q 
deposit rate ceilings. Similarly, deposit-taking institutions 
did not compete for mortgage borrowers on rate. 
3 Securitized mortgages through the GSEs funded the 
long-term fixed rate mortgage after rising inflation decapi-
talized the S&Ls. The “housing finance revolution” ended 
deposit regulation and linked housing finance markets to 
credit markets (Green and Wachter 2005). The GSEs contin-
ued to impose credit constraints for “prime” mortgages that 
they guaranteed (Levitin and Wachter 2012). 
4 There is some evidence of the GSEs expanding credit 
(Frame et al. 2015), while borrowing constraints remained 
close to historical levels before the early 2000s (Rosenthal 
2002). 
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period, household debt increased faster than 
income (Mian and Sufi 2015), driven by the 
increasing volume and market share of nontradi-
tional mortgages (NTM), subprime lending, and 
second liens.
Gabriel and Rosenthal (2015) show that age 
specific homeownership rates increased after 
2000 beyond levels explainable by observables. 
Barakova, Calem, and Wachter (2014) show 
that, in the years 2003 to 2007, credit constraints 
eased considerably relative to historic norms. 
National homeownership rates peaked in 2004. 
Despite the easing of lending constraints, rising 
house prices increased the share of households 
affected by constraints (Barakova, Calem, and 
Wachter 2014).
Debates exist as to where credit was directed: 
to minority and low-income households (Mian 
and Sufi 2015); across the entire income spec-
trum (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino 2015; 
Acolin, An, Bostic, and Wachter 2015); or to 
investors (Haughwout et al. 2011).
As the credit expansion took place, the 
market share of subprime and NTM products 
increased, but neither the risk characteristics 
of the mortgages issued, nor how the risk was 
priced, was known (Levitin and Wachter 2012). 
In the aftermath, we now know that rising prices 
and price expectations were associated with 
increased NTM issuance (Brueckner, Calem, 
and Nakamura 2012; Pavlov and Wachter 2011)
As house prices peaked in January 2006 
and then rapidly declined, with subprime and 
NTM issuance going near zero, over a third of 
US homes with mortgages fell “underwater.” 
Plummeting collateral values and a weakening 
economy, combined with the risky character-
istics of the loans originated during the boom 
period, drove foreclosure rates to their highest 
ever recorded levels. In response, a third regime 
shift took place.
III. Borrowing Constraints and Homeownership 
After the Great Recession
The homeownership rate declined from a 
high of 69 percent in 2004 to 63.7 percent in 
the third quarter of 2015 (US Census Bureau 
2015).5 In response to high foreclosure rates 
5 The decline in homeownership was particularly pro-
nounced among  30 to 39-year-old household heads who 
and “ put-backs” to originators of defaulting 
mortgages, lenders and secondary market insti-
tutions tightened the “credit box.” Evidence 
on credit availability, based on the characteris-
tics of borrowers, indicate tightening of mort-
gage underwriting over the period  2008–2013 
beyond historic norms (Goodman, Zhu, and 
George 2015). Nonetheless the impact of tight-
ened credit on homeownership has not been 
estimated.
We estimate the impact of borrowing con-
straints on homeownership after the Great 
Recession using the Federal Reserve Survey of 
Consumer Finance (SCF) for 2010 and 2013 
and compare these estimates to those obtained 
using previous (2001, 2004, and 2007) surveys (Acolin, Bricker, Calem, and Wachter 2015). 
The SCF has detailed information about house-
hold wealth and income and variables to impute 
a credit score based on the model developed in 
Barakova et al. (2003). In addition, with access 
to local information it is possible to estimate 
the (unconstrained) preferred house value for 
a household, given their place of residence, to 
identify constrained households.
We find that tightened borrowing constraints 
have a substantial negative impact on the proba-
bility of becoming a homeowner in the aftermath 
of the Great Recession. In the overall population, 
the estimated marginal decline in the likelihood 
of being an owner, associated with being sub-
ject to one or more of the three borrowing con-
straints (wealth, income, or credit), is 26 percent 
in 2001 and 23 percent in the period  2004–2007. 
Following the Great Recession (for the period 
 2010–2013), the marginal effect of being con-
strained is a 30 percent decrease in likelihood of 
owning—substantially larger than in 2001 and 
 2004–2007 (Table 1).
Table 2 presents predictions of the home-
ownership rate in the overall population in 
 2010–2013 compared to  2004 –2007, the loos-
ened credit regime, and compared to 2001, the 
historical credit regime. The homeownership 
rate in  2010–2013 is 5.2 percentage points lower 
experienced a 10.4 percentage point decline between 2004 
and 2014 (from 61.9 to 51.5 percent) compared to a 4.6 per-
centage point decline in the overall population. The current 
homeownership rate would be even lower without the aging 
of the population. At 2004 age structure, the homeownership 
in 2014 would be 62.8 percent instead of 64.5 percent (US 
Census Bureau 2015). 
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than it would have been if the constraints were at 
the  2004 –2007 level and 2.3 percentage points 
lower than if the constraints were set at the 2001 
level.
IV. Conclusion
The rationing of credit in the mortgage mar-
ket due to imperfect information impacts house-
holds’ propensity to own. In the  post-World 
War II era, institutional shifts and mortgage 
product innovation increased access to mort-
gages and homeownership. In the decade 2000 
to 2010, changes in the mortgage market led to 
house price volatility, due to significant easing 
and then tightening of the credit box, to levels 
beyond historic norms and, ultimately to signifi-
cant declines in homeownership rates.
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